China's rise is changing the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. The old order no longer holds, a new one is still in the making. This poses risks for the stability of the region and the world.
US-Philippine military maneuvers “Balikatan” in March 2022
“When China awakens, the world will tremble.” The first part of this quote, commonly attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, describes the present. China has awakened and is clearly announcing its claim: 2049 – on the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party – , according to party leader and President Xi Jinping at the 20th party congress in October this year, China will be “worldwide be leaders when it comes to national strength and international influence.” And not only in economic terms, but also in terms of geopolitical and security policy.
With China's new claim, the previous security architecture in Asia, which has existed since the end of the Korean War in 1953, is “really challenged” for the first time, as political scientist Felix Heiduk from the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin wrote in a recent study on “Security in the Indo-Pacific”. notes.
Hub and spoke system
At the heart of Asia's security architecture was the existing hub-and-spoke system, which was almost 70 years old. The hub is formed by the USA, which has concluded bilateral alliances with a total of five partners, the so-called spokes (Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Australia).
In addition, the USA has agreed on many security policy partnerships in the region in recent years (see chart). These include the special relationship with Taiwan, which is regulated by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. At that time, the US broke off relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in order to establish them with the People's Republic of China. The law stipulates that any coercive change in the status quo by Beijing will be considered a threat to the US, and allows for the supply of defensive arms to Taiwan.
In 2014, Xi Jinping stated that the established and security architecture dominated by the USA is a “relic of the Cold War”. The US-led system should be replaced by a regional, Asian-led system.
China itself does not enter into any military alliances, apart from the historical exception of North Korea. However, in recent years the People's Republic has entered into partnerships with Russia, Cambodia, Laos, Iran and Pakistan (see graphic). Andrew Small of the German Marshall Fund even described the partnership with Pakistan as a “quasi-alliance” in his recent book “The China Pakistan Axis”.
Other Security Forums for the Pacific
In addition to these two security networks centered around the USA and China, there are traditionally other partnerships in Asia that are intended to ensure security and stability. For example, the forums set up by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or the East Asia Summit (EAS), which are primarily intended to build confidence but are dismissed by critics as ineffective. However, not only the ASEAN countries are represented in them, but also the USA, China, India and Japan.
All in all, it can be stated that the hub-and-spokes system, according to Heiduk, has not developed “a collective defense or security system” like there is with NATO in the Atlantic and with the Warsaw Pact. Instead, there are bilateral alliances and partnerships that are generally not networked with each other.
Neither the hub-and-spoke system nor the various ASEAN security forums have created a permanently stable foundation for security in Asia .
Hot spots and rearmament in Asia
A selection of current trouble spots, which close like an arc around the People's Republic of China, shows how fragile the security situation in Asia is.
In addition, arms spending in the region is increasing from year to year. China is focusing primarily on modernizing its armed forces. As early as 2012, then-head of state and party leader Hu Jintao declared that China had to become a “major maritime power” militarily. Many states in the Indo-Pacific are increasingly investing in submarines, comparatively expensive and complex weapon systems that have a particularly large deterrent potential. Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia and last but not least Australia have concluded submarine deals in recent years.
All in all, Asia is facing the challenge of redesigning security, because the previous security architecture is no longer sufficient, as the incidents that are becoming more frequent and violent and the increasing armament show – when in doubt, everyone only relies on themselves.
New Indo-Pacific strategies needed
The response to the challenge of China's rise and growing uncertainty is busy business. Some actors have presented Indo-Pacific strategies, such as Japan, Australia, India and ASEAN. The trend has continued to Europe, where Germany its “Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific” and the European Union as a group of states have presented the “EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region”.
The so-called Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) between the USA, Australia, Japan and India has deepened in recent years. A meeting of foreign ministers has been announced for early 2023. As part of the QUAD, Japan has announced in its defense strategy that it will build up a “counter-strike capability”. Among other things, Tokyo announced in mid-December that it would double its arms spending. According to the nationalist mouthpiece of the Communist Party “Global Times”, China interprets the QUAD as an “informal anti-China security group”.
“Asianization” of the Security
In addition to the Indo-Pacific strategies and the QUAD, other primarily bilateral and minilateral cooperation and partnerships are emerging, such as the Indonesian-Indian military maneuver “Samudra Sakti”, or so-called “comprehensive strategic partnerships” between Vietnam and China, Russia and India , which were recently expanded to include South Korea.
The hub-and-spoke system will remain in place, said Heiduk at a presentation at a conference on the South China Sea at the University of Hamburg, but it is coming in the face of Chinese pressure at borders. As an alternative, a kind of spider's web is emerging: More and more cross and side connections are emerging, especially among Asian countries.
For this reason, Heiduk also attests to an “Asianization”, ie a relative decrease in the importance of the USA and a corresponding increase in the importance of Asian actors. To a certain extent, Xi's demand for an Asian solution has even been fulfilled, albeit not in the sense of a Pax Sinica, i.e. a security order dominated by China, but in the sense of a steadily growing network of mostly bilateral security cooperation among Asian actors.
Conflicting interests in the Pacific
What Heiduk's detailed analysis also shows: The various actors have very different interests and ideas for the reorganization of security in the Indo-Pacific.
Indonesia, for example, pursues an explicitly cooperative and inclusive approach. It explicitly sees China as a partner and shareholder. “So Jakarta is trying to offer an inclusive, ASEAN-centric security policy alternative to the deepening Sino-American bipolarity in the Indo-Pacific,” said Heiduk.
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In contrast, the US, India and Australia “think regional security architecture as a construct in which security is built against, not with, China.” The aim is to curb China's geopolitical claims and to spread the burden on several shoulders, because the USA has recognized that they need additional partners to be able to stand up to China in Asia.
Growing insecurity instead of security
The different interests and strategies make it clear that security in Asia is increasingly viewed antagonistically by important actors. For influential players like the USA, Australia or India, security means containing China or securing one's own supremacy. The result: growing tensions and a threatening overload of the hub-and-spoke system. It is still unclear whether the new security “spider web” that is emerging will be enough to stabilize the region.
The corona pandemic is having a certain impact on the consequences of the outbreak of a conflict in the region demonstrated: supply chains have been torn down, the global economy has shrunk dramatically. The Ukraine war, on the other hand, gives an idea of the devastating consequences a war over Taiwan – whose full reunification by force of arms Xi did not explicitly rule out at the 20th party congress – would have for Asia and the world. The world would tremble.