Med sommaren har det infunnit sig en stiltje i striderna i Ukraina. Medan de ukrainska styrkorna omgrupperar måste de fråga sig hur de ska förhindra liknande nederlag som i Sievjerodonetsk – och hur de på sikt kan börja ta tillbaka mark som ockuperas av Ryssland, skriver militärexperten Jack Watling i The Economist. Det är viktigt att inte förivra sig. En storskalig motoffensiv kan ske först efter att man med hjälp av västerländska vapen slagit ut stora delar av det ryska artilleriet. Därefter måste alla ukrainska soldater som fortfarande saknar ordentlig militärutbildning förberedas noggrant. Ukraina kan vinna kriget, men det kräver att dess allierade i väst står kvar vid landets sida, skriver Watling. A large-scale counterattack is possible. But Ukraine must not strike Russia prematurely, says the military expert By Jack Watling July 25th 2022 RUSSIA’S INVASION of Ukraine on February 24th brought about a desperate scramble among allies for weapons to equip the Ukrainian armed forces. Countries prioritised sending what was immediately available, and what the Ukrainian military could use with minimal training. But as the war drags on, a Ukrainian victory now requires its friends to be more methodical in the support they provide. The gruelling battle in the eastern city of Severodonetsk illustrates the challenges faced by Ukrainian forces as they prepare for the next round of fighting. Russia’s success there was achieved in three stages. First, Russian armoured thrusts to the north and south brought the roads leading to Severodonetsk into artillery range, preventing Ukraine from setting up its own artillery to defend the city. Second, Russian infantry attacks on the city forced Ukrainian forces to defend unsupported positions. Third, Russian artillery killed and wounded thousands of Ukrainian soldiers. There is now a lull in the fighting. Ukraine has withdrawn to a more defensible line to the west, while Russian forces have paused to bring up freshly mobilised units and reposition their guns. As they regroup, Ukraine and its partners must answer two questions. How can they prevent Russia from repeating what it did in Severodonetsk? And how can Ukraine begin to retake its lost territory? The first step is to defang Russia’s military. Poor training and low morale among its troops have made the Russian military dependent on artillery fire as its foremost means of killing the enemy, or driving them backwards. At the height of the fighting for Severodonetsk Russian forces were firing 20,000 rounds a day, and they are thought to have sufficient ammunition reserves to keep this up for several years. But this dependence on artillery is also a major vulnerability. Because Russia has limited stocks of precision weapons, and even fewer personnel with the training to operate them, it relies on the mass application of unguided shells. These must be moved from large depots and stockpiled before being shuttled to Russian batteries by logistics units. The scale of materiel involved means that these stockpiles cannot be readily concealed, making them a relatively easy target. As Ukraine has demonstrated over the past two weeks, precision long-range rocket strikes can effectively starve Russia’s artillery of ammunition. However, that merely suppresses Russia’s guns rather than removing the threat, since Russia can just move more ammunition forward. How long Ukraine can sustain this suppression depends on the number of rockets its partners are able to provide. The other important question is what Ukraine does with the freedom created by the lifting of Russian fire. Without the threat of constant shelling, it should be possible for Ukraine to step up its attacks on Russia’s guns themselves. For this, Ukraine will need its allies to provide a consistent supply of 155mm artillery ammunition for its newly acquired NATO-built howitzers. Ukraine is rapidly burning through its stocks of Soviet-legacy 152mm ammunition, and so must transition to NATO systems if it is to destroy Russia’s guns. Ukraine will also need plenty of unmanned aerial vehicles to locate targets. Russia is using electronic warfare to prevent Ukrainian drones from collecting accurate location data. One way to suppress that interference would be to provide Ukraine with anti-radiation loitering munitions: essentially, munitions that can home in on the emissions given off by Russian jammers. The final means by which the Russian military can be defanged is through the destruction of its command-and-control infrastructure. Unlike the destruction of ammunition, which only suppresses Russia’s artillery, the destruction of headquarters—and therefore of trained operators who are familiar with Russia’s battlespace management systems—will have a more permanent effect. These people cannot be replaced quickly. Their deaths will slow down the Russian invasion. These steps combined may cripple Russia’s ability to seize more Ukrainian territory. But a true Ukrainian victory will also require liberating territory that has already been captured. This will demand a large-scale counteroffensive. Here, it is important to appreciate that some Ukrainian military units are more capable than others. The best, comprising around five brigades—a brigade typically comprises 2,000-4,000 troops—are highly skilled and have a wealth of military experience. These units, however, have been at the forefront of the defence throughout the past five months, have suffered heavy casualties, and are exhausted. The bulk of Ukraine’s military today is made up of conscripts who have received just days of training and have been learning on the job. While distributing some personnel from existing units among the conscripts has helped to raise standards, these units lack experienced commanders who can co-ordinate combined-arms actions. If Ukraine is to conduct a major counteroffensive and ultimately drive the Russian army out, these individuals must be properly trained and prepared. Infantry usually receive 28 weeks of training; Ukrainian volunteers being trained in Britain are receiving just three. Ukraine’s partners could provide training to both command staff and new recruits. But it is also important to ensure that Ukraine does not launch a counterattack before its forces are fully prepared. Otherwise it risks incurring heavy casualties. Now that Ukraine’s survival is assured, its international allies must properly evaluate the scale and timeframe required to bring about victory. Ukraine can win this war, but it needs the sustained support of its friends. Dr Jack Watling is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a defence and security think-tank. © 2022 The Economist Newspaper Limited. All rights reserved.
Saturday, May 18, 2024